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COULD LOVE
THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT. Richard
Ekins.' Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012. Pp. xiv + 303.
$70.00 (cloth).
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INTRODUCTION
For generations intentionalism was the touchstone of
statutory interpretation among common law jurists (pp. 1-3). The
thrust of intentionalism is that the original intent of the legislature
is the core of the statute's meaning and the key to its application
(p. 2).' In recent decades, however, this approach has come under
withering attack from scholars and judges and fallen into relative
disfavor, particularly in the United States (p. 3).
Although many courts continue to pay rhetorical fealty to
intent and to cite to legislative history, the intellectual energy
among dedicated originalist scholars and jurists has moved toward
textualist interpretation. According to textualists, a statute means
what its words say, and those words are to be understood only by
reference to what the community of people who voted on it would
reasonably have understood it to mean at the time it was enacted.'
The move from intentionalism to textualism in the context of
statutory interpretation thus parallels the relative decline of
original intent jurisprudence and the rise of original public
meaning jurisprudence in the constitutional context.
Comes now Richard Ekins, in a book adapted from his
Oxford doctoral thesis, to rehabilitate intentionalism. Grounded

1. Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford University.
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I am grateful
to Matthew Traut for his excellent assistance in editing this review essay.
3. F.A.R. BENNION, BENNION ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 469 (5th ed.
2008).
4. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012).
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in political philosophy, language theory, and the characteristics of
group dynamics and decision-making, Ekins maintains that there
is such a thing as legislative intent, that it is discoverable, and that
the job of a judicial interpreter is to give effect to it.
Scholarship may be judged on a variety of metrics. Does an
article or book provoke further thought and inquiry? Does it
teach the reader something new? Does it contribute to the further
development of ideas? Is it intellectually rigorous? On any of
these metrics, The Nature of Legislative Intent is an astonishing
success and required reading for any student of statutory
interpretation.
But there is another metric according to which legal
scholarship may-should! -be judged. Can it change how legal
actors behave in the real world? I do not mean, of course, to
endorse the view of our current Chief Justice that most legal
scholarship is useless because judges pay no attention to it.5 What
judges choose to read is irrelevant as an assessment of the quality
and potential contribution of the work. Instead, I mean to ask
whether the work, on its own terms, offers some practical upshot.
Thus, if a judge read it, was convinced by its arguments, and
inclined to heed its advice, could she change her behavior in any
way?
By this measure-one that is surely controversial, but at least
fair in assessing a work that the author offers as having practical
value -I'm afraid that this book is something of a disappointment.
In the end, the intentionalism that Ekins offers, namely,
intentionalism without legislative history, has precious little to
distinguish it from the textualism practiced in the United States.
Any American judge who might find it persuasive is already doing
what Ekins wants under the label of textualism; and any judge
who isn't engaged in textualism will not be convinced by his case
for intentionalism.
In this essay, I first identify the common critiques of
intentionalism. I then summarize Ekins' philosophical defense of
and affirmative case for intentionalism and review his proposed
interpretive methodology. Finally, I show why this version of
intentionalism is, as a practical matter, more or less the same as
Justice Scalia's intentionalism while at the same time
unpersuasive to non-textualists.

5. Bryan A. Garner, Interviews with United States Supreme Court Justices. Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 13 SCRIBESJ. LEGAL WRITING 5,37 (2010).
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I. THE DECLINE OF INTENTIONALISM

Intentionalism is likely the original theory of legal
interpretation. As Ekins notes, its pedigree can be traced far back
in history, at least to Aquinas, through Hobbes, and to Blackstone
(pp. 1-2). Treatises and judicial opinions throughout common law
countries adopted its central tenets (pp. 2-3). In American
jurisprudence, intentionalism found broad acceptance and
expressed itself in opinions that carefully scrutinized statutes'
legislative history to locate the legislature's actual or constructive
intent as to an ambiguous provision's meaning. 6 The idea was that
the best way to determine the legislature's intent was to see what
the legislators told us and each other they meant.'
Over time, a loose hierarchy developed among sources of
legislative history. Committee reports are the gold standard,
because they are at once the most authoritative (the legislators
most familiar with the bill, or rather their staffers, produce the
legislative history) and the most accessible to other members of
the legislature. Next on down the line are statements by drafters
and supporters of the bill, which other Members of Congress may
view as authoritative but are less accessible than committee
reports. And so on.8
This approach has long had its detractors, 9 but over the past
three decades in particular it has fallen into disfavor as a result of
a sustained attack led by textualists. There are at least eight
critiques of classical intentionalism as practiced by American
judges:
1. There is no such thing as legislative intent because a
multi-member body can never have a single intent (pp. 45);
2. A legislature in particular cannot have any intent
because members who vote for the bill may themselves
have different intentions and ends in mind (p. 5);o

6. Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1005,1009-11 (1992).
7. See James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation",43 HARV. L. REV.
886, 888 (1930).
8. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,63640 (1990).
9. See generally Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
10. Id. at 870.
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3. The multiplicity of sources of legislative history make
it impossible for judges to identify an intent (even if such
a thing could exist) (p. 6);"
4. The multiplicity of sources invites unprincipled judges
to impose their own views onto a statute and then
rationalize their ruling by
2 pointing to legislative history
that supports that view;
5. Intent, even if it exists and is identifiable and
adequately constrains judges, is irrelevant to the meaning
of the statute because only the words enacted by the
legislature carry the force of law; 3
6. Reference to legislative history discourages careful
statutory drafting and deliberation on the part of the
legislature because legislators understand that judges will
look beyond the statute's text to divine its meaning;' 4
7. Manipulative legislators will produce a paper trail in
the statute's legislative history, which is never voted on
by the larger body, for friendly or credulous judges to
follow; 5 and
8. The public will not be able to understand what the law
requires of them because they have neither access to the
reams
of legislative history nor the ability to understand
16
it.

In the face of these attacks, intentionalism's luster wore off among
legal scholars and, to a degree, among judges.
Textualism has risen in its place, at least among statutory
originalists. Like intentionalists, textualists believe that a statute's
meaning and correct application is fixed at the time of the statute's
enactment. Unlike intentionalists, though, textualists generally
(though not always) reject the use of legislative history to divine
statutory meaning and application.
Instead, textualists interpret a statute by asking what a
reasonable legislator voting on the bill would most likely have

II. Id. at 870-71.
12. See Frank H. Eastcrbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 441,448-49 (1990).
13. See Eskridgc, supra note 8, at 654; see also Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 444.
14. See Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable
Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813-14 (1998).
15. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994), see also Note, supra note 6, at 1016-17.
16. See Kozinski, supra note 14, at 813.
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understood it to mean." Individual words and phrases are
typically to be understood according to their most common
meaning, dictionary meaning, specialized meaning, or established
legal meaning. 8 Also of central relevance to the textualist inquiry
are the textual and contextual canons of interpretation, the
interconnected parts of the statute, and the pre-existing law at the
time the statute was enacted. 9 Focusing on these sources alone,
maintain the textualists, prevents the harms that intentionalism
invites and pays fealty to the law. That is, judges may be
adequately restrained, legislators are properly incentivized to
perform their jobs with care, the public can more likely
understand the law, and the law itself is properly restored to the
words of the statute.
To be sure, not everyone is convinced by the critique of
intentionalism or by the alternative offered by textualists. Some
intentionalists remain; or, at least, intentionalist rhetoric remains
in use and judges sometimes still justify their opinions by
reference to legislative history. Moreover, some theorists and
judges maintain that originalism of either sort- intentionalist or
textualist-does not hold all of the answers to statutory
interpretation. That is, a statute's meaning and proper application
may be indeterminate at the time of enactment and may even
change over time.20 (More about these heretics later.21 ) But it is
fair to say that the past decades have seen a broad move away
from intentionalism and toward textualism in the pages of law
reviews and those of judicial opinions. And it is even fairer to say
that no one has offered a sustained defense of intentionalism in
recent years.
II. THE REHABILITATION OF INTENTIONALISM
Into this breach steps Richard Ekins. The first part of his case
for intentionalism, which takes up the bulk of the book and offers
its richest philosophical insights, focuses on those critiques
identified above, specifically, the first, second, and fifth, that deny
the relevance or possibility of legislative intent.

17. See HILLEL Y. LEVIN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A PRACTICAL
LAWYERING COURSE 116 (2014).
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory
Interpretation,2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2012).
21. 1 am such a heretic. I argue elsewhere that Justice Scalia might be onc too. See id.
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Ekins begins his affirmative argument by drawing on political
theory to assert that the purpose of having a lawmaker is for it to
act as the agent of the polity to change the law when there is good
reason for change (pp. 123-25). No matter who the lawmaker isan individual prince or a multi-member, representative legislative
body-it must undertake rational, careful, and complex
deliberate process that considers the pre-existing law, identifies
the problems with it, and chooses the means of changing and
improving it through detailed legislation (pp. 128-29). The
legislature structures its decision-making process by adopting
procedural rules that enable it to accomplish these ends (pp. 16169).
He further argues that the pure semantic or literal meaning
of the statutory language enacted by the legislature cannot
capture the legislature's highly intentional process and therefore
underdetermines the intent (pp. 211-17). For this proposition, he
refers to a rich body of language philosophy and demonstrates its
application to actual legislation (pp. 196-205).
This description of the nature of the legislative task and the
capacity of language is mostly uncontroversial (though I am aware
of no other work that so carefully and accessibly makes the case,
which is itself a testament to the value of this work). Even
textualists, who as we will see are not to be conflated with
literalists, if any exist, might agree to it. They would simply
maintain that the text of the statute, though not capable of
reflecting the depth of the legislative process and the intent of the
speaker, is nevertheless the full extent of the actual law, and thus
the alpha and omega of the interpretive process, at least for
judges.
It is therefore Ekins's next move, which strikes me as both
enormously insightful and ultimately persuasive in its attack on
textualist theory, that is critical in setting his account apart.
Because the legislature is the agent of the polity and its very
purpose is to engage in the deliberative and legislative process,
neither the legislature nor the polity could rationally accept a
mode of statutory interpretation that ignores that intentional
process (pp. 250-51). In other words, in order for the legislature
to accomplish the job assigned to it, interpreters must take
account of legislative intent. The legislative act cannot be divorced
from the legislative intent. Here, of course, lies the dividing line
between the intentionalist and the textualist.
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Ekins must still answer the critique that a multi-member
body cannot have a single intention behind its acts. His response
is elegant and nicely sets up his practical interpretive
methodology. It is a fundamental mistake, one made by critics of
intentionalism and intentionalists alike, to equate the legislative
intent with that of any individual legislator or of a majority of
legislators. On this score, he mostly accepts the textualist critique.
Indeed, he agrees that individual legislators' intent is irrelevant,
whether secret or expressed (pp. 230-36).
Instead, according to Ekins, legislative intent is that plan
which is proposed for legislative action and that which the
legislators jointly intend to enact through a positive vote. It is
therefore at the time of the final vote on a bill that the legislature's
intent is expressed. At that moment, if the vote is positive, the
legislature's intent is expressed, and the intent it conveys is to
respond to the social problem by changing the underlying law
through the means of the statutory scheme as a whole and as
informed by the larger body of law into which the new one nests
(p. 230).
This move also responds neatly to the remaining critiques of
intentionalism identified above, because it renders legislative
history unimportant in the search for legislative intent. Ekins
makes explicit that this is what he means later in the book when
he concludes that legislative history, though arguably relevant to
the interpretive project, should be rejected in order to maintain
the integrity of the careful legislative process (pp. 268-71). By
excluding legislative history from the judicial inquiry into
legislative intent and statutory meaning, Ekins thus sidesteps all
of the criticisms of intentionalism that arise due to its use.
In his final chapter Ekins offers a practical methodology for
judges engaged in statutory interpretation. The core of his
approach entails careful consideration of the full context within
which a particular statutory provision appears. That context
includes, first, the entirety of the statutory text, which is to be read
as a coherent whole according to well-known canons of
interpretation (avoiding surplusage, the rules of consistent usage
and meaningful variation, and so on) (pp. 247-48, 257). Second,
the meaning of a law is informed by the broader context, namely
the surrounding body of law, meaning related statutes and other
sources of law as well as the pre-existing law that the new statute
changed (p. 257).
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Third, judges should carefully consider the mischief that gave
rise to the need for new legislation. The factual context that
relates to the statute's enactment, or at least those facts and
concerns that were known to the legislature, are highly relevant
to the statute's proper interpretation and application because it is
based on those facts and concerns that the legislature intends to
legislate (pp. 257-58).
Finally, Ekins allows for what he calls equitable
interpretation in a small universe of exceptional, unforeseen
cases, where the legislature's intention is inconsistent with the
legislative text (pp. 275-76). In such cases, Ekins maintains that
the legislature's intent controls, primarily because the context
within which the legislature acted did not allow it to predict the
new circumstances. As such, the legislature intends that an
unwritten statutory proviso be understood to qualify the statute.
Recognizing that the possibility for such equitable interpretation
potentially opens the door to substantial judicial mischief, Ekins
is at pains to limit the kinds of cases to which it might apply (pp.
277-78).
In sum, Ekins's intentionalism instructs judges to locate
legislative intent in the words of the relevant statutory provision,
the statute as a whole, and the broader legal and social context.
Together, those sources convey the legislature's intent, which
itself constitutes the law.
III. WHAT IS LEFT OF INTENTIONALISM?
This account of intentionalism is an alluring one, but it rejects
the central intentionalist tool that, as a practical matter,
distinguishes intentionalism from textualism (as actually
practiced by judges), namely resort to legislative history. Indeed,
there is likely not a modern textualist in the United States who
would reject the contextual methodology that Ekins proposes.
To understand why this is so, let us reduce Ekins's account of
intentionalism to its barest essence: a statute means what an
informed legislature would have intended it to mean at the
moment of enactment in light of the full context in which the
statute is enacted. Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court's resident
avatar of textualism, would likely take issue with only one word
in that description, "intended." He would simply substitute the
word "understood." As a matter of political philosophy and
language theory, these words might put Ekins and Scalia at some
distance from one another. But practically speaking, because
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Ekins rejects the use of legislative history in the search for
legislative intent, he and Scalia propose essentially identical
methodologies.
The one potential area of practical disagreement between
Ekins and the textualist would be Ekins's allowance for equitable
interpretation. I suppose it is possible that some textualists would
take issue with Ekins's methodology and conclusions in such
cases, but that possibility does not put much practical space
between the two theories, for two reasons. First, as already
mentioned, Ekins emphasizes that equitable interpretation
applies to only a narrow, exceptional group of cases. Therefore,
we are talking potentially about only a handful of cases in which
Ekins's approach has practical implications. A handful is not
nothing, but it also isn't much, and I suspect that Ekins intends his
theory to have more purchase than that.
Second, and much more importantly, I suspect that a judge
applying textualism could easily arrive at the same result in the
few cases in which his vision of equitable interpretation applies as
Ekins does. That is not to say that every textualist must arrive at
the same decision, but a textualist inclined toward it has enough
tools to work with that she need not resort to this type of
intentionalism. For example, Ekins suggests that a statute
prohibiting vehicles in the park does not apply to an ambulance
entering the park to save an injured person even if such a proviso
is not expressed in the statute. In his understanding, the act of the
legislature in enacting this statute must be tempered by its obvious
intention not to apply these words to ambulances, because they
did not think of it (pp. 276-77).
It is hardly the case, however, that a textualist must
necessarily disagree. Rather, she might apply the rule against
absurd results to arrive at the same conclusion. Or, more likely,
she would find related statutes in the broader legal context that
privilege ambulance drivers, emergency situations, and human
life above traffic laws as a general matter. (The classical
intentionalist would chuckle to himself and observe that resorting
to legislative history would only make this case all the easier, and
that there is therefore little reason to categorically reject its use.)
This example underscores that, in some set of cases, textualism is
indeterminate: an insight that some textualists would cringe at,
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but also one that non-textualists (at least) take to be self-evident.22
And the same holds true for most, and possibly all, of the few
examples of equitable interpretation that Ekins approvingly cites.
I suspect that one reason that Ekins's methodological
approach does less to distinguish itself from textualism as
practiced by judges than he seems to think is that he conflates
textualism with semantic literalism (pp. 180-81). He would hardly
be the first student or scholar of statutory interpretation to do so,
but the truth is that textualism, whether one fully embraces it or
not (I do not), is far more attuned to legislative context and the
surrounding body of law than Ekins acknowledges.
A more charitable explanation for Ekins's imperfect account
of textualism is that he situates himself and his discourse more in
England than in the United States. It could be that textualists
there are more inclined toward literalism than are textualists here.
I am not prepared to assess that possibility, because I am hardly
expert in that milieu, so I simply acknowledge the possibility that
Ekins's account of intentionalism may have greater practical
relevance across the Pond. If so, then good for him, but he ought
to have been more careful to distinguish the contemporary
American textualist tradition from whatever it is that he is taking
on.
If The Nature of Legislative Intent has little of practical
consequence to offer the textualist (or at least the modern
American textualist), then what about for the non-textualist?
Could Ekins potentially change the minds and behaviors of judges
who embrace pragmatic, eclectic, and other non-originalist
approaches to interpretation like those offered by Richard
Posner,' Bill Eskridge, ' EinerElhauge, or me? Unfortunately,
Ekins declines to address the central critiques of these non-

originalist interpretive theories, thus making it unlikely that he
can convince them to reject their approaches in favor of his.
Further, because these non-intentionalist, non-textualist
theorists' allowance for legislative history in the interpretive
process is not tied to a search for legislative intent, he is unable to
22. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW
REPUBLIC, (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.newrcpublic.com/article/magazine/books-andarts/] 06441 /scalia-garncr-reading-thc-law-tcxtual-origina ism.
23. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008).
24. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994)
25. See generally EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008).
26. Levin, supra note 20.
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persuade, without having said much more, that they should reject
legislative history as well.
To be clear, I do not mean that the choice not to engage these
approaches is any great crime or even that Ekins should have
written a longer book that tackles all of these theories. He is
entitled to begin with whatever a priori assumptions he wishes,
including the one that dominates among originalists-namely,
that originalism is all there really is. But it is unfortunate for us
and for him that he has chosen not to do so. It is unfortunate for
us, because we miss the prospect of having our ideas directly
assessed and challenged by someone with his cogent style, keen
insight, and fresh ideas. It is unfortunate for him, because he
forecloses the possibility of a greater practical impact.
CONCLUSION
There is something useful, indeed beautiful, about a work
that carefully and eloquently explores a new idea or reexamines
an old one. The Nature of LegislativeIntent is therefore useful and
beautiful, and it offers much of philosophical value for textualist
and non-textualist alike. But it offers little of practical
consequence and is therefore unlikely to advance the ball outside
of the halls of academia, not simply because of the failure of
judges to take legal scholarship seriously (which is their loss, as
well as society's), but because on its own terms it cannot.

